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The gist is that imperialism – rather than being exceptional, 
aberrational, over and done with – was and remains defini-
tive of occidental political and legal formation. But there is, 
for legal formation, a twist. Whilst the constituent connec-
tion to the imperial can account for a primacy accorded law 
(in such guises as the rule of law), the terms of that same 
connection import an unbounded law resistant to imperium. 
An instance and an origin of the pervasion of the imperial 
can be found in recent critical engagements with ‘periodiza-
tion’ in history, especially with the putative transition from a 
medieval period to a modern along with its transcending of 
temporality. Propelled by this instance and origin, the story 
then expands ‘in time’ to absorb the saturation of the occi-
dental polity in the imperial, and it does so in the perhaps 
unlikely company of Foucault, especially by way of his ‘Soci-
ety Must be Defended’. Still in the company of Foucault, this 
imperial trajectory comes to be realized and resisted in and 
as law. 
 
‘…  to [law] alone, pure transcendence’ – Blanchot
1
  
Le Clézio opens Terra Amata by remarking on the significance of 
having an epigraph, and without offering one himself he notes that 
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‘it looks well and the author covers himself to a certain extent by 
referring to someone more important than he is’.
2
 The additional 
reason for invoking Blanchot is that he provides a culminating point 
which orients this essay – that is, his finding that the law ‘affirms 
itself as law and without reference to anything higher: to it alone, 
pure transcendence’.
3
 That focal trajectory may now render the be-
ginning of this investigation decidedly perverse. A claim that imperi-
alism – rather than being exceptional, aberrational, over and done 
with – was and remains definitive of occidental legal formation does 
invoke a ‘reference’ to something ‘higher’ than law. What is more, 
and still in a perverse vein, the claim should surely have initial and 
extensive regard to the towering presence of James Whitman and 
especially to his ‘Western Legal Imperialism: Thinking About the 
Deep Historical Roots’.
4
 My concern here is oriented somewhat dif-
ferently. Not that this in any sense involves a rejection of Whitman’s 
account. I need all the help I can get. Rather, I would adopt Whit-
man’s account in admiration – and will adopt it in that he finds and 
traces a constituent dynamic of ‘Western law’ that is imperial. My 
point will be that, whilst occidental law is comprehensively and in-
strumentally bound to the imperial, it is still and at the same time 
more than this, and has to be more than this.  
To find both law’s imperial cast (in a couple of senses of the word) 
and to unravel its being more than this, my search will not be for 
Whitman’s ‘deep historical roots’, for roots found in antiquity, even 
as he brings them brilliantly to bear in modern colonialisms and in 
current forms of the ‘new imperialism’. Rather, my concern will be 
with something like a history of the present, to borrow a phrase – a 
concern with how the constituent, the self-constituent, yet contradic-
tory claims of modernity can be made out, and how law is of prime 
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significance in that making out. All of which is not to deny that stra-
tegic raids on Whitman will not be made en route. 
One raid could be on the apt importance Whitman attributes to 
Christianity, but continuing in the vein of perversity for a little long-
er, let me start with the advent of a putatively secular occidental mo-
dernity, and do so initially in the company of Nietzsche’s supremely 
sane madman.
5
 In The Gay Science, we find the madman, ‘having in 
the bright morning lit a lantern’, proclaiming to a group of mocking 
moderns gathered in the marketplace that he is looking for God, on-
ly to fix them in his stare and announce that God is dead and, fur-
thermore: ‘We have killed him – you and I! We are all his murderers’. 
The madman then puts a series of piercing questions to his audience. 
In muted summary: How could we possibly encompass this deed? 
How could we survive in the ultimate uncertainty that results from it? 
What substitutes will we have to invent to replace the murdered God? 
His audience is silent and disconcerted. He realises he has ‘come too 
early’, realises that news of this deicide, of this ‘tremendous event’, is 
still on its way, yet to reach ‘the ears of men’. ‘This deed,’ he con-
cludes, ‘is still more remote to them than the remotest stars – and yet 
they have done it themselves!’. 
The news is indeed taking some time to get around. From the six-
teenth century, and not unconnected to the coming of global coloni-
zation, God was decreed, if not exactly dead, then solidified in being 
bound to the workings of the world. The continuing delay in trans-
mission would, for Nietzsche, be reflected in the constant resort to 
numerous ‘sacred games’ which with the death of God we will ‘have 
to invent for ourselves’.
6
 Such sacred games make up a collection of 
deific substitutes in what is by now a crowded pantheon – crowded 
even though, emulating the Greeks of antiquity, some inhabitants 
have come to be forced out by others. For Nietzsche, the most con-
spicuous ‘new idol’ was the State, a state that would still act like ‘the 
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ordaining finger of God’.
7
 Other contenders would include nature, 
giving way latterly to society – an entity which has no need of exter-
nal reference, as Lefort says, because it is ‘transparent to itself’, or 
‘intelligible in itself’; there is ‘an illusion which lies at the heart of 
modern society: namely, that the institution of the social can account 
for itself’.
8
 There are many other instances but what they all share is 
a proprietary or exemplary claim to ontological completeness, a 
condition that is self-constituent and a claim that is made operative 
in varieties of an expansive imperium, and indistinguishably so in 
and as imperialism itself. Thence, Whitman confirms, an imperially 
embedded ‘Western law’ distinctively lays claim to a universal ap-
plicability, at least ‘in principle’, and in this it is accompanied, still 
distinctively, by ‘missionary/colonizing tendencies’.
9
 
Now for a spot of heresy. The law which Whitman traces from an-
tiquity to now does end up being ‘fit for purpose’ – that is, for the 
purpose of an encompassing imperium. What is more, Aldo Schia-
vone’s recent The Invention of Law in the West would firmly, very 
firmly, bind Western law constituently to a Roman and imperial 
origin.
10
 Yet this was not the law on which modernity has, as it were, 
to work. Persisting with a history of the present, and taking a ‘long 
present’, the law that emerged and began to consolidate in Europe 
from the sixteenth century was not simply or only an inheritance 
from what went before, including in what went before the aptly 
vaunted and so-called revival of Roman law. There was doubtless 
inheritance, but it was not an inheritance of law, but of laws. At 
least in the earthly realm, there was a variety of contending laws, 
none of which secured, or even purported to secure, either an ulti-
macy of comprehensive determination or an overarching systemic 
inclusion. The taking on of these qualities comes, emerges, with the 
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assumed ability to effect them arrogated by deific substitutes which 
were themselves then emergent. All of which still leaves much room, 
of course, for an inexorable inheritance.  
And all of which also leaves us with a dual dependence that is con-
trary to received truth. The resulting law is in one perspective utterly 
dependent for its content and force on, variously and for example, 
nature, sovereign (cuius regio, eius religio), society, the state of the 
judge’s digestion and other varieties of ‘legal realism’. Yet the inher-
itance of the revived Roman law, at least, would import an inde-
pendent, even autonomous law. Yet further, the very inexorability of 
inheritance, our inability – as Cromwell put it in the midst of revolu-
tion – our very inability to leap out of one condition and into anoth-
er (Putney Debates), stands starkly incompatible with the character-
istic claim of modernity to an ontological completeness that is sui 
generis. Clearly we have a few more issues to sort out. And we could 
perhaps begin to sort them out by staying where we are, at least im-
plicitly: by staying with the issue of the origin. And we could thence 
ask how a self-sufficing modernity could originate at all? Allow me 
now to plunge into the context of an answer.  
This involves the intense concern of late with historical periodization, 
a concern which has been most conspicuous in scholarly resistance to 
the relegating of a medieval age which thence provides the constitu-
ent contrast to a modern age.
11
 What is entailed in that relegation is 
the invention, an ‘imposition’, of an encapsulated age against which 
a modern age is putatively set – not just a supposedly status-ridden, 
oppressive medieval or feudal age but also the like attributions to 
various ‘non-Christian’, barbaric or savage peoples excluded from a 
universalized civility.
12
 In the process these periodized oppositions, 
or strands of them, can become blended. The medieval and the reli-
gious will usually be packaged together for example. And periodized 
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oppositions can also be part of or fused with other venerable expedi-
ents. So, progressivist and teleological histories will typically operate 
as sequenced or streamed periodizations. 
In all and to borrow from Kathleen Davis’s searing analysis, periodi-
zation ‘results from a double movement: the first, a contestatory 
process of identification with an epoch, the categories of which it 
simultaneously constitutes …; and the second a rejection of that 
epoch identified in this reduced, condensed form …’.
13
 In this way, 
and for example, modernity is ‘defined … toward the Middle Ages’, 
a period it ‘will never let go’.
14
 In sum, the definition entails the in-
vention of an encapsulated age as modernity’s constituent alterity. 
And that invention, Kathleen Davis again, does not involve ‘simply 
the drawing of an arbitrary line through time, but a complex process 
of conceptualizing categories which are posited as homogenous and 
retroactively validated by the designation of a period divide’.
15
 The 
division is not simply found. It is made.  
To effect such homogeneity periodization assumes an all-
encompassing ontological comprehension, one which relegates other 
conditions to a contained historical specificity. So, for Davis, the 
‘secularization’ conceived in opposition to the ‘religious’ Middle Ag-
es ‘turns political difference into temporal distance’ thereby setting 
apart the religious as ‘spiritual’ and relegating anything political 
about it to a terminal past.
16
 This manoeuvre enables ‘the sublima-
tion of theology in the “world”’ – what Derrida would call an ‘on-
totheology’.
17
 That theology, in turn, mediates connection with a 
sovereignty which Derrida often found, in its ‘unlimited and uncon-
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ditional powers’, to be a ‘theo-logic’, something that ‘remains a theo-
logical inheritance that has not really been secularized’.
18
  
What is often referred to nowadays, with some precision, as the 
‘myth’ of Westphalia, a myth of origin, can instance this arrogating 
periodization. As Lesaffer tells us: ‘historians and international law-
yers alike have for a long time been quite unanimous in calling the 
Peace Treaties of Westphalia of 1648 the very birth certificates of the 
modern European states system and the modern law of nations’.
19
 
Or as Inayatullah and Blaney would put it, ‘the predominant view of 
the Peace of Westphalia’ sees it ‘as signalling the move from a reli-
gious to a modern, secular world and from the accepted, if some-
what vaporous, goal of united Christendom to a system, or perhaps 
society, of independent states’.
20
 This was a supposedly secular state 
system in which spatially demarcated entities can marvellously as-
sume the capacity of universal determination. And just as marvel-
lously, and according now to Koskenniemi, the society of these inde-
pendent states would ‘arise from itself and not from any religious, 
moral or political notions of the good given externally to it’.
21
 Indeed 
such a society was to have no commonality at all, and this to such a 
complete extent that, according to Vattel, none of its members 
‘yield … rights to the general body’, each sovereign state being 
somehow ‘independent of all the others’.
22
 Mercifully, Lesaffer also 
references several ‘scholars from various countries and disciplines’ 
who by now ‘have gone a long way to challenging this Westphalian 
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myth’.
23
 Most would question whether there was a qualitative break 
from the medieval into the ‘modern’ state system, and in so doing 
they would emphasise key elements of continuity between the two 
such as the fact that cohesive ‘independent’ states pre-existed West-
phalia, and close observation of its ‘complex territorial settlement 
reveals Westphalia did not establish or consolidate a principle that 
states constitute their own authority in and of themselves’.
24
  
A helpful qualification: such revisionism does vary. Some scholars, 
whilst finding that Westphalia does not mark quite as complete or 
quite as sudden a shift as the myth would import, also find that 
eventually and overall what flows from it is a scene that assumes the 
same mythic content. It is a matter of a ‘fabulous retroactivity’ – 
borrowing the term from Derrida.
25
 What is needed to create the fa-
ble, says Latour of a broadly similar scene, is ‘[a] whole supplemen-
tary work of sorting out, cleaning up and dividing up … [so as] to 
obtain the impression of a modernization that goes in step with 
time’.
26
 The ‘beautiful order’ that is supposed to ensue ‘is disturbed’ 
when its creation is, accurately, ‘seen as mixing up different periods, 
ontologies or genres. Then a historical period will give the impres-
sion of a great hotchpotch. Instead of a fine laminary flow, we will 
most often get a turbulent flow of whirlpools and rapids’.
27
 
So, there had and has to be a distanced enfolding of the point, the 
event of origin – ‘[t]he origin is distancing’
28
 – a distance necessary to 
allow for an encompassing mythic invention which evoked some el-
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ements of the originated and ignored those others which would ob-
viate it. Thence, in summary and with a touch of tautology, when 
closely observed the originated entity produced as all-surpassing 
proved to be integrally tied to what went before it. This tie is to 
more than evanescent elements that eventually diminish and disap-
pear. So, for example, the insistent element of the religious is not 
simply a remnant fading in its antithetical ether. It is a symptom of 
more, infinitely more. 
The assumed ability of a periodized modernity to encompass a mani-
fold and cognitively illimitable ‘age’ and relegate it as entirely and 
constituently ‘other’ calls for a universalized efficacy – an efficacy 
that emanates from modernity to include the process of periodization 
itself. The challenge confronting this periodization, then, becomes 
but an instance of that confronting the modern claim to ontological 
completeness. That claim in its various manifestations as Nietzsche’s 
‘sacred games’, as deific substitutes, has to subsist apart from and 
determinatively encompass anything that may ever affect it, and in 
this it must account entirely for itself. Such an artefact, then, must be 
able to draw all immanence and all potentiality into its bounded self. 
Crucially, this imports a self-constituent claim to transcendence, a 
claim made in what is now a supposedly secular world that cannot 
explicitly accommodate it. 
In an occidental modernity that impasse is evaded by resort to a neg-
ative universal reference – to a reference which does not itself, in it-
self, take on positive, explicate content but, rather, derives its con-
tent negatively. In short, the entity thus elevated becomes what cer-
tain alterities are not or it becomes not what certain alterities are. 
There are numerous routes available in engaging with this negative 
universal reference and in seeking to endow its negativity with deci-
sive content. The route followed here weaves through Foucault’s ‘So-
ciety Must Be Defended’.
29
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Starting with Foucault’s expansive paradigm, that of racism, we find, 
in opposition to a preceding division between races, a racism that is 
‘biologically monist’, encompassing, as it does, a single ‘species’ and 
protecting, as it does, the ‘racial purity’ of that species. This, more 
expansively, is a protection of ‘the integrity, the superiority, and the 
purity of the race’.
30
 Such superiority imports division within the 
unity, and a division as somehow primary: ‘[t]hat is the first function 
of racism: to fragment, to create caesuras within the biological con-
tinuum addressed by biopower’.
31
 It may reveal more of that seeming 
contradiction if this racism is now situated. 
Overwhelmingly, Foucault identified racism with a ‘State racism’.
32
 
This was and is a racism the ‘activation’ of which stems from the 
persistence of ‘the old sovereign power’ in its ‘national universality’ 
together with ‘the way biopower functions through it’.
33
 Although 
Foucault did see ‘the science of government’ with its incorporation of 
biopower as oriented towards ‘pre-eminence over all other types of 
power’, including a weakened sovereignty, still for him sovereignty 
has a sustained, even heightened significance.
34
 This significance can 
be discerned in the mutual dependence of state sovereignty and a bi-
opower which, pervasive as it may be, is not self-enforcing ultimately. 
And it is in this equation that racism provides for Foucault the co-
hering element. So it is, Foucault finds, ‘the emergence of … biopow-
er that inscribes [racism] in the mechanisms of the State’, and ‘[i]t is 
at this moment that racism is inscribed as the basic mechanism of 
power, as it is exercised in modern States’.
35
 Such power, along with 
its sustaining scientism, is self-endowed with the means to encom-
pass life by way of the mediation of racism, to encompass determi-
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nately what is illimitable. This feat is achieved in the negative univer-
sal reference.  
The negative universal reference forms in four fused stages. The first 
has already been observed in the unity of the species. This makes 
possible the comparison of the ‘superior element’ and the inferior.
36
 
For present purposes, the second stage is intimated in Foucault’s 
finding in that fertile nineteenth century a new ‘knowledge of man’, 
‘a knowledge of individuality, of the normal or abnormal, conform-
ing or nonconforming individual …’.
37
 This normal individual inhab-
iting a ‘normalizing society’ is constituently distinguished from the 
‘abnormal’, ‘the evil, … the non-normal’.
38
 More pointedly, the ab-
normal is ascribed a positive content in the negation of which the 
normal acquires its content. And this negative assumption of content 
absorptivity accommodates the illimitability of the constituent cov-
erage of bio- and disciplinary powers.  
The third and, finally, fourth stages in constituting the negative uni-
versal reference are the seeming obverse of the second. With its puta-
tively pervasive control of life and the living, ‘[t]he universally disci-
plinary and regulatory society’ of racial exclusion would exclude 
completely.
39
 What is excluded from the universal can only be utterly 
excluded. Yet the universal has to be all-inclusive. So the universal 
negative reference generates an antithesis but then has to be able to 
include that antithesis within itself, within its integral self. That im-
perative has two consequences. With one, and this is the third stage, 
the utterly excluded are nonetheless bidden to progress, or reform, or 
in some other way achieve inclusion. With the other and the fourth 
stage, along with its potential now to enter the universal, the antithe-
sis resides always potentially within the bearers of the universal. ‘We’ 
were once savages and may regress, or ‘we’ may fail a constantly 
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demanding disciplinary norm of ‘our’ society. Or ‘we’ may simply 
and of necessity be incorporated within some biopolitical determina-
tion.  
The negative universal reference provides, then, a bridge to the fur-
ther reaches that make up Foucault’s expansive idea of racism. The 
initial expansion is not exceptional. The biological has at times been 
regulated through biopower in explicitly racist terms, such as with 
eugenics. And for Foucault eclipsing all else, there is ‘the paroxysmal 
development’ of biopower in ‘the Nazi regime’.
40
 Also, in the over-
lapping periods during which Foucault traced the emergence of bi-
opower and of disciplinary power and for some time after, racist dis-
course was used to incorporate and regulate the insane, the working 
class, women, sexuality, children and criminals.
41
 And it is not unu-
sual to find with Foucault that various sites of power have generated 
racism, such as sexuality, medicine, class and psychiatry.
42
 As with 
the negative universal reference and racism ‘proper’, these sites of 
biopower and discipline create the ‘abnormal’ and the ‘anomaly’ as 
the formative force of their created content. An instance: ‘[t]he ges-
ture that divides madness is’, for Foucault, ‘the constitutive one, not 
the science that grows up in the calm that returns after the division 
has been made. The caesura that establishes the distance between 
reason and non-reason is the origin …’.
43
 Thence ‘Reason and Mad-
ness’ become ‘foreign to each other, deaf to any exchange, almost 
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dead to each other’.
44
 And so, ‘men … communicate and recognise 
each other in the merciless language of non-madness’.
45
 
The abnormal generalized thence becomes ‘another people within the 
same people’.
46
 They are both ‘interior and foreign’, subjected to ‘an 
inclusion through exclusion’.
47
 That condition is then inflected to-
wards and inhabits an uneasy normality: 
… the child is more individualized than the adult, the pa-
tient more than the healthy man, the madman and the de-
linquent more than the normal and the non-delinquent … 
[W]hen one wishes to individualize the healthy, normal 
and law-abiding adult, it is always by asking him how 
much of the child he has in him, what secret madness lies 
within him, what fundamental crime he has dreamt of 
committing.
48
 
Of course such sites of power, as well as the state, come to rely less 
on racism explicitly, yet the generative structuring of power in terms 
of the negative universal reference remains pervasive. 
My culminating concern will now be with what this infra-
imperialism imports for law – for how we understand law. And it 
may orient matters here to resort summarily to a persistent jurispru-
dential divide. One side of the divide would picture an abject law, a 
law dependent for its content and force on something apart from it – 
nature or the natural, variations of imperium, society, and much 
more. On the other side of the divide, law is seen as autonomous and 
as a rule of law capable of providing an ultimate normative determi-
                                                 
44
 ibid xxvii. 
45
 ibid; and cf Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Hu-
man Sciences (Tavistock 1970) 379. 
46
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Alan Sheridan tr, 
Penguin Books 1979) 253. 
47
 Foucault, The Order of Things (n 45) xxiv; and Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and Ju-
ridical Forms’ in Michel Foucault (ed) Power: Essential Works of Foucault 1954: 
1984 (Robert Hurley and Others trs, Penguin 2001) 78. 
48
 Foucault, Discipline and Punish (n 46) 193. 
 
Birkbeck Law Review Volume 1(1) 
76 
nacy. The argument would be, in sum, that the divide reflects an 
aporetic quality of law which ensues from the negative universal ref-
erence, and that aporetic quality is generative of what law ‘is’. 
The negative universal reference ensued in turn, and as we saw, from 
the necessity of a transcendent reference in and as an occidental mo-
dernity. That reference cannot be rendered positively because this 
modernity was founded on an immanent secularity, one in which the 
transcendent was relegated to the entirely incidental and dispensable. 
Yet with such modernity neither sovereignty nor society (for example) 
can subsist without a positive transcendent reference that is norma-
tively determining. The very claim to an ontological completeness 
depends on a transcendent reference, and what goes to generate 
modern law is the inability of a negative universal reference to effect, 
assuredly and pointedly, a positive determinacy. 
Such law when in the service of imperium and society has to assume 
a normative determinacy across a universal range, and to do this it 
has itself to be illimitable. Yet such an illimitable law would be a va-
cuity free of any constraining content of its own. So, although able 
thence to provide a positive determinacy, such law would not itself 
be tied to any positivity. And in its illimitability, it stands apart from 
the delimited entities which in its instrumental subordination it oth-
erwise serves. And it is in such standing apart that law provides the 
transcendent point from which positive determination can flow – a 
singular and ultimate point at which law can determinately cohere 
yet otherwise be incipiently vacuous. Such vacuity, the inability to be 
fixed to any positivity, enables law to effect a transcendence that is 
‘pure’ in its not being implicate with a transcendence that is endur-
ingly positive. Here then we find with Blanchot a law that ‘affirms 
itself as law and without reference to anything higher: to it alone, 
pure transcendence’.
49
 
Such law becomes perhaps the most elegant instance of Foucault’s 
notion of resistance. Notoriously, the Foucault concerned with pow-
er saw it as having such an encompassing and all-pervasive reach as 
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to preclude, one would have thought, the very possibility of re-
sistance. And Foucault does present resistance as having a subordi-
nate ‘role of adversary, target, support or handle in power rela-
tions’.
50
 Yet this role of resistance is pressed by Foucault as one on 
which the ‘existence’ of ‘power relationships’ depends.
51
 Not only 
that, resistance is not something ‘doomed to perpetual defeat’ but is, 
rather, ‘inscribed in’ relations of power ‘as an irreducible opposite’.
52
 
As an irreducible opposite, law ever awaits radical realization.  
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